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THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A BRITISH TALE 
OF CONTESTABLE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Adam Tomkins* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United Kingdom and, indeed, across the common law world, the 
constitutional relation of parliamentary government to the courts is contested. 
In constitutional law the controversies are relatively well known: should 
courts have the power to strike down legislation they hold to be incompatible 
with basic rights? Should legislatures be able to insist on their rights-infring-
ing legislation notwithstanding a judicial ruling that there is an incompatibil-
ity? Questions such as these have been at the fore of debates not only in the 
United Kingdom, but in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. But similar 
controversies abound also in administrative law and, in particular, in the re-
lationship of executive to judicial decision-making.  
In common law parliamentary systems the executive is drawn from the 
legislature. In the United Kingdom all government ministers are members 
either of the House of Commons or of the House of Lords. To those more 
familiar with presidential than parliamentary democracy, this may appear at 
first sight to be a straightforward separation of powers problem. But the over-
lap of personnel between the legislative and executive branches in common 
law parliamentary systems is perfectly deliberate. It occurs in order to help 
with—and not to hinder—the core constitutional function of holding the 
powerful to account. Ministers can do only what they can politically get away 
with. Parliamentary systems seek to find ways of allowing ministers politi-
cally to get away with less. Weak ministers in a robust legislature will find 
that the parliamentary processes of debate, question-and-answer, and com-
mittee inquiry operate so as to limit their room for maneuver. For sure, strong 
ministers who can command the confidence of the legislature in which they 
sit will enjoy significant authority. But even here, such authority lasts for 
only as long as the minister in question continues to enjoy the confidence of 
his or her fellow lawmakers. In this way, counter-intuitive though it may be 
from a strict separation of powers perspective, the intertwining of legislature 
and executive in a parliamentary system is actually designed to be a check 
on ministerial power.  
In a parliamentary system, ministers—the key decision-makers in the 
administrative state—are accountable directly to the legislature of which they 
are members. Thus, as a British citizen, if a minister is doing something that 
I disagree with, I can contact my Member of Parliament and invite her to put 
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political pressure on the minister to change course. Indeed, in the British par-
liamentary system ministers are primarily accountable politically to Parlia-
ment. The courts, historically, have played only a secondary role.  
This is true at least as far as central government is concerned. Central 
government is divided into several departments, each of which is headed by 
a minister who is a member of one of the two Houses of the United Kingdom 
Parliament. Of course, hundreds of thousands of executive decisions will be 
taken each year by officials—civil servants—working in departments. But, 
under English law, those decisions are regarded formally as those of the min-
ister him- or herself: “Constitutionally, the decision of such an official is . . . 
the decision of the minister” said Lord Greene MR in the leading case.1 
Where executive or administrative decisions are taken in contexts where 
there is no minister, the courts have played a more prominent role in ensuring 
that the standards of reasonableness and fairness are upheld. Local govern-
ment decisions, and the decisions and actions of police officers, have, for 
example, been prone to judicial review for longer and in a manner that is 
more intense in its scrutiny than has traditionally been the case as regards 
ministerial decision-making.2  
In recent years, however, the courts in the United Kingdom—as else-
where in the common law world—have become considerably more interven-
tionist when it comes to the judicial review of ministerial decisions. Judges 
have shed their former deference to political and parliamentary forms of ac-
countability, as if judicial review should supplant, rather than merely supple-
ment, ministerial responsibility to Parliament.3 This shift—from politics to 
law, from Parliaments to courts—has been seen not only in the United King-
dom, but in countries as diverse as Canada and South Africa, Israel and New 
Zealand. Its effects in constitutional terms have been much documented.4 
This article focuses on the effects of this shift in terms of administrative law, 
taking as a case-study two recent developments in the United Kingdom. The 
first concerns immigration and, in particular, ministerial decisions holding 
that it is necessary in the public interest to deport an individual from the UK.5 
The second concerns freedom of information and decisions holding that it 
would be contrary to the public interest for certain information to be pub-
lished.6 Each of these cases marks an attempt to shift the constitutional guard-
ianship of the public interest from politically-accountable government to the 
  
 1 Carltona Ltd. v. Comm’rs of Works and Others [1943] 2 All ER 560 (appeal taken from Eng.).  
 2 See, e.g., R (On the Application of the Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis) v. Police Appeals 
Tribunal [2011] EWHC (Admin) 3241. 
 3 See, e.g., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL REVIEW: PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER REFORM, 2013, 
Cm. 8703, at 19 (UK) [hereinafter JUDICIAL REVIEW]. 
 4 See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 1–4 (2004); STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 97, 129 (2013).  
 5 See infra Part II.A. 
 6 See infra Part III. 
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courts of law. What were formerly seen as political judgements for parlia-
mentary oversight have come to be viewed—at least by certain judges—as 
questions of law for the courts to determine. Before coming to the two case-
studies, however, we need to set the scene.  
I. CONTESTING THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 
In the United Kingdom, the constitutional relation of parliamentary gov-
ernment to the courts is contested. It is vital to understand that there is noth-
ing new about this. For example, the campaign to incorporate the terms of 
the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic UK law lasted for 
a quarter of a century, from Lord Scarman’s Hamlyn lectures of 19747 to the 
enactment twenty-four years later of the Human Rights Act 1998.8 In the 
1970s the most famous defense of the view that the courts should play only 
a limited role in administrative law was Professor J.A.G. Griffith’s polemic, 
The Political Constitution.9 In large measure, Griffith was seeking to rebut 
the charges of liberal lawyers such as Lord Scarman and Professor Ronald 
Dworkin that the old Westminster model was no longer fit for purpose and 
needed to be replaced by a new model, based either on the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) or on American-style judicial review, 
in which appeals courts would enforce basic or constitutional rights against 
ministerial incursion.10 Griffith, echoing Bentham, considered this to be 
“nonsense on stilts”.11 Rights, thought Griffith, were political claims dressed 
up as law.12 When freedom of expression—to take just one example—may 
be limited where “necessary in a democratic society” in the interests of a 
legitimate end, as Article 10 of the European Convention provides,13 what 
you have, in Griffith’s terms, is “the statement of a political conflict pretend-
ing to be a resolution of it.”14 Deciding where the limits of free speech should 
lie is a matter of political judgement, Griffith thought, and in a democracy 
  
 7 See SIR LESLIE SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAW—THE NEW DIMENSION 12–14 (1974).  
 8 The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates most of the substantive rights contained in the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) into UK law. Before the Act came into force (in 2000) the 
United Kingdom was bound by the terms of the ECHR as a matter of international law, but the rights 
contained in the ECHR could not be relied upon in domestic litigation. See COLIN TURPIN & ADAM 
TOMKINS, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 277–84 (7th ed. 2011).  
 9 See J.A.G. Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 MOD. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979).  
 10 Id. at 13–14. 
 11 Id. at 18. See also JEREMY WALDRON, NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX 
ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 36-37 (1987).  
 12 See Griffith, supra note 9, at 17. 
 13 Eur. Convention on H.R., art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, Rome, 4.XI. 1950, www.echr.coe.int/ 
Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
 14 Griffith, supra note 9, at 14.  
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such as the United Kingdom, political decisions should be made by politi-
cians: that is to say, by people who are politically removable.15 Political ques-
tions do not cease to be political simply because you hand them to a court to 
determine.  
Griffith’s essay remains a leading point of reference and has been re-
examined by generations of scholars—the controversy about the proper con-
stitutional role of the courts in the administrative state is not new.16 There 
was significant contestation in the 1970s and 1980s about whether the United 
Kingdom needed a Bill of Rights.17 Similarly, there has been a lively argu-
ment since 1998 about whether the Human Rights Act has inappropriately or 
unwisely augmented the role of the courts in the public life of the United 
Kingdom.18 If it was perfectly legitimate for Lord Scarman, Ronald Dworkin 
and many others to campaign from the 1970s to the 1990s for the powers of 
the courts to be increased, likewise in the early twenty-first century it is per-
fectly legitimate for those who worry that the courts have now become too 
powerful to advocate reforms designed to re-set the balance. It is not an af-
front to the rule of law to argue that policy should be made by politicians and 
not by judges. On the contrary, those who argue that the courts should con-
fine themselves to matters of law—and should not seek to extend their reach 
to political questions—do so in order to safeguard and sharpen the rule of 
law.  
In the 1970s and 1980s resistance to the idea that the United Kingdom 
needed a Bill of Rights could be found both on the Left and the Right of 
British politics. Griffith was a man of the Left.19 But the Conservative gov-
ernment that was elected to office in the year The Political Constitution was 
published never contemplated incorporating the ECHR into domestic law: no 
Human Rights Act or British Bill of Rights would be enacted during Mrs. 
Thatcher’s period in Downing Street.20 If we fast-forward to the present day, 
  
 15 Id. at 16. 
 16 See, e.g., ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 60–61 (2005); Graham Gee, The 
Political Constitutionalism of JAG Griffith, 28 LEG. STUD. 20, 22 (2008); Thomas Poole, Tilting at Wind-
mills? Truth and Illusion in the Political Constitution 70 MOD. L. REV. 250, 251–53 (2007).  
 17 See Cristina E. Parau, Constitutional Ferment in the United Kingdom: Towards a Republican 
Constitution (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/The_British_ 
Constitution_after_1989_v._1_SENT.pdf. 
 18 See Luke Gittos, The Human Rights Act is No Friend of Freedom, SPIKED (May 10, 2016), 
http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/the-human-rights-act-is-no-friend-of-freedom/18335#. 
WA5zs-ArLb0. 
 19 See J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 211–13 (1977); David Dyzenhaus, The 
Left and the Question of Law, 17 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 7, 8 (2004).  
 20 Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister from 1979-90; upon her resignation John Major replaced 
her as leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister. History of Britain: 1945 to Present, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/timeline/present_timeline_noflash.shtml (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
He lost office and resigned at the 1997 election, when Tony Blair led the Labour Party back to power. Id. 
The Human Rights Act was passed in Tony Blair’s first year as Prime Minister. Mark Rathbone, The 
Human Rights Act: A Magna Carta for the Twenty-First Century, POL. STUD. ASS’N, at 2 (May 2014), 
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concern about the increased power of the courts is now found almost exclu-
sively on the political Right.21 It is instructive, for example, that the center-
right think tank, Policy Exchange (routinely described in the British press as 
Prime Minister David Cameron’s favorite think tank), has established a Ju-
dicial Power Project, described on its website as follows:  
The focus of this project is on the proper scope of the judicial power within the 
constitution. Judicial overreach increasingly threatens the rule of law and effective, 
democratic government. The project aims to address this problem—restoring bal-
ance to the Westminster constitution—by articulating the good sense of separating 
judicial and political authority. In other words, the project aims to understand and 
correct the undue rise in judicial power by restating, for modern times and in relation 
to modern problems, the nature and limits of the judicial power within our tradition 
and the related scope of sound legislative and executive authority.22 
In opposition, the Conservatives did not support the Blair government’s 
constitutional reforms of 1997-2001.23 From 2010-15 the United Kingdom 
had a coalition government, led by the Conservatives but with Liberal Dem-
ocrat support. Since May 2015 the UK has had a majority Conservative gov-
ernment once again (for the first time since 1997). In coalition, the Conserva-
tives sought to make a number of reforms designed to reset aspects of the 
relationship between parliamentary government and the courts.24 One of 
these—in the area of immigration and deportation—will be examined in 
depth in Part II.25  
In its manifesto for the 2015 general election, the Conservative party 
pledged to reform what it called “Labour’s human rights laws” by scrapping 
the Human Rights Act 1998 and replacing it with a British Bill of Rights.26 It 
  
http://magnacarta800th.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Rathbone-Essay-Human-Rights-Act-and-
Magna-Carta1.pdf. 
 21 My former colleague, Professor Keith Ewing at King’s College London is now perhaps the sole 
commentator on the Left who remains staunchly critical of Britain’s human rights laws. See generally K. 
D. EWING, BONFIRE OF THE LIBERTIES: NEW LABOUR, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2010).  
 22 Judicial Power Project, About the Judicial Power Project, http://judicialpowerproject. 
org.uk/about/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).  
 23 See Tony Blair: Prime Minister of United Kingdom, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https:// 
www.britannica.com/biography/Tony-Blair (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). As well as the Human Rights Act 
1998 this period saw also the devolution of power to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, reforms to 
the membership of the House of Lords, the creation of regional government (and a Mayor) in Greater 
London, and the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Lesley Dingle & Bradley Miller, A 
Summary of Recent Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom, 33 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 71, 79–81, 
83–89, 92 (2005). 
 24 See Oliver Wright, Unshackled from Coalition Partners, Tories Get Ready to Push Radical 
Agenda, INDEPENDENT (May 9, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/ 
unshackled-from-coalition-partners-tories-get-ready-to-push-radical-agenda-10237611.html. 
 25 See infra Part II.B. 
 26 THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY MANIFESTO 60 (2015), https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/ 
manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf.  
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is understood that the new British Bill of Rights will, like the outgoing Hu-
man Rights Act, be based on the rights enshrined in the European Convention 
on Human Rights but that their incorporation into UK law will be undertaken 
in a way that invests less discretion in the courts and leaves more decision-
making power in the hands of ministers.27 In this way, the Conservatives hope 
that European human rights norms and Britain’s traditional prioritization of 
political decision-making might be more happily reconciled than has been 
the case under the Human Rights Act.28 However, the whole matter remains 
controversial, and at the time of writing we still have yet to see any detail 
from the government.29  
It will be apparent from the numerous references above to instruments 
of human rights law that much of the argument concerning the proper role of 
the courts focuses on fundamental rights. It is important, however, to under-
stand that not all of it does. The matter is broader than that. It may well be 
that one of the most important influences behind the growing power of the 
courts in the United Kingdom is the Human Rights Act 1998, but the growth 
of judicial power is not confined to cases about basic rights. The analysis in 
Part III of this essay, on freedom of information, is a case in point (freedom 
of information is not a human right protected by the European Convention 
on Human Rights).30  
From 2010-2015, the Conservative-led coalition government pursued a 
series of reforms to the law and practice of judicial review.31 The common 
law of judicial review allows the courts to review the lawfulness of the exer-
cise of administrative power on grounds such as rationality and procedural 
fairness (it is not concerned with the review of legislation against constitu-
tional standards). The law of judicial review is the core of administrative law 
in the United Kingdom. Since the 1970s, judicial review has grown to an 
astonishing degree, both in volume and in importance. In England and Wales 
there were 4,500 judicial review cases in 1998 but 12,400 in 2012.32 The vast 
bulk of the expansion over this period was in cases concerned with decision-
making in immigration.33  
  
 27 See Luke Gittos, The Liberal Case for Scrapping the Human Rights Act, SPIKED (Aug. 24, 2016), 
http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/the-liberal-case-for-scrapping-the-human-rights- 
act/18689#.WA6C6-ArLb0. 
 28 See id. 
 29 A useful summary of the position down to 2013 is given by Mark Elliott. See Mark Elliot, A 
Damp Squib in the Long Grass: The Report of the Commission on a Bill of Rights 10–13 (Univ. of Cam-
bridge Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 8/2013, 2013). 
 30 See infra Part III. 
 31 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS: THE IMPLICATION FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE OF THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS TO REFORM 
JUDICIAL REVIEW, 2014, Cm. 8896, at 3–4 (UK). 
 32 JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 3, at 8. The figures for Northern Ireland and for Scotland are dif-
ferent from those of England and Wales.  
 33 Id. 
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As well as the increase in volume, judicial review also plays a more 
prominent role in public life than ever before. The law requires that for a 
claimant to be able to bring a judicial review case, he or she must have a 
“sufficient interest” in the matter.34 Over the course of recent years the courts 
have relaxed this requirement, so that interested parties, pressure groups, and 
campaigners have been able to use judicial review more and more freely as a 
means of challenging government policy.35 Formerly understood as a means 
for an aggrieved litigant to seek a remedy for an injustice suffered, judicial 
review has become a campaign tool, in which the generality of government 
policy, rather than a specific instance of alleged injustice, is challenged in 
court.36 The changing nature of judicial review is compounded by the grow-
ing acceptance of third-party interventions, in which campaign groups join 
proceedings as additional parties to the litigation. This can be useful where it 
brings to the attention of the court matters relevant to the legal dispute but 
overlooked by the parties; however, overused, it can have the effect of turn-
ing adjudication into something more resembling a seminar. It risks blurring 
the line between the legal resolution of disputes (a judicial function) and in-
quiring more broadly into where the public interest lies (a political func-
tion).37  
Introducing its proposals for reform of judicial review, the government 
explained as follows:  
Judicial review is a critical check on the power of the State, providing an effective 
mechanism for challenging the decisions, acts or omissions of public bodies to en-
sure that they are lawful. The Government will ensure that judicial review continues 
to retain its crucial role. The Government is though concerned about the use of un-
meritorious judicial reviews to cause delay, generate publicity and frustrate proper 
decision making. This is bad for the economy and bad for the taxpayer.38  
  
 34 See JUSTICE & FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, TO ASSIST THE COURT: THIRD PARTY 
INTERVENTIONS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 64 (2016) [hereinafter JUSTICE & FRESHFIELDS]. 
 35 For example, a pressure group was permitted to seek judicial review of the decision by the Di-
rector of the Serious Fraud Office to abandon a criminal investigation into British Aerospace over an arms 
contract agreed between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia and a peace activist was permitted to seek 
judicial review of the Ministry of Defence’s transfer of prisoners in custody in Afghanistan. See R (Evans) 
v Sec’y of State for Def. [2010] EWHC (Admin) 1445, [2011] A.C.D. 11, 11 (appeal taken from Eng.); 
R (Corner House Research) v. Dir. of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60, (2009) 1 AC 756, 756 
(appeal taken from Eng.). Both claims were unsuccessful, but each illustrates the extent to which rules of 
standing have become relaxed. 
 36 See JUSTICE & FRESHFIELDS, supra note 34, at 7; Cadder v. HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43, [1] 
(appeal taken from Scot.). 
 37 See ERIC METCALFE, A JUSTICE REPORT: TO ASSIST THE COURT: THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS 
IN THE UK 4-5, 11 (2009); JUSTICE & FRESHFIELDS, supra note 34, at 1, 3–4.  
 38 JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 3, at 5.  
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A particular concern for the government was the use of judicial review 
to disrupt and delay major infrastructure and other large-scale planning deci-
sions—on projects that (in challenging economic circumstances) were in-
tended to stimulate growth and promote economic recovery.39  
The government consulted on its proposals and was subject to a barrage 
of criticism from lawyers and legal interest groups. The human rights pres-
sure group, Liberty, led the charge, declaiming that the proposals would “all 
but shut down the availability of judicial review,” that this would have “grave 
consequences for . . . the Rule of Law,” and that the proposals were “wrong-
headed,” “incoherent and unsubstantiated,” and that Lord Chancellor was 
“badly confused.”40 A newspaper article introducing the government’s pro-
posals was condemned as “bizarre, divisive and misleading”.41 Shrill hyper-
bole has become a favorite rhetorical style in Liberty briefings, its response 
to the government’s judicial review proposals being no exception.42 Justice, 
the legal pressure group, was more moderate in its language, while sharing a 
number of Liberty’s concerns.43 Of the Bill that followed on from the pro-
posals, Justice wrote that they were “concerned that the proposals . . . are . . 
. unnecessary and potentially damaging” in that they “could inhibit access to 
justice.”44 Aspects of the changes proposed by the government were “inap-
propriate and unjustifiable,” Justice said.45  
Eventually, the government brought forward legislative proposals to 
make only two core changes to the law and practice of judicial review.46 After 
lengthy parliamentary wrangling, even these were further diluted. They were 
eventually enacted in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.47 Section 84 
of the Act provides that courts “must refuse” a claim for judicial review “if 
it appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant 
would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had 
not occurred.”48 At a late stage in the legislation’s passage through Parliament 
a proviso was added: that a court may allow such a claim to continue “for 
reasons of exceptional public interest.”49 Previously, the courts had discretion 
  
 39 Id. 
 40 LIBERTY, LIBERTY’S RESPONSE TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE’S CONSULTATION ‘JUDICIAL 
REVIEW: PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER REFORM’ 3–4 (2013). 
 41 Id. at 4. 
 42 See id. at 3–4. 
 43 See Justice, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND COURTS BILL: JUDICIAL REVIEW (HOUSE OF LORDS SECOND 
READING) 2 (June 2014). 
 44 Id. at 3. 
 45 Id. at 7.  
 46 See Justice, Criminal Justice and Courts Bill, https://justice.org.uk/criminal-justice-courts-bill/ 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2016). 
 47 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, c. 2 (UK). The Act also includes specific provisions on 
planning appeals, in addition to the changes made to judicial review. 
 48 Id. c. 2, § 84(1)(2A). 
 49 Id. c. 2, § 84(1)(2B). 
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to refuse a claim for judicial review when it was “inevitabl[e]” that, even if 
the claimant won the case, it would make “no difference.”50 The government 
sought to tighten this rule in two respects: to make the test one of high like-
lihood rather than inevitability, and to turn the rule from a discretionary to a 
mandatory one.51 The House of Lords sought to resist both changes and was 
prevailed upon to accept them only with the addition of the “exceptional pub-
lic interest” proviso—a late government concession.52  
Section 87 of the Act concerns interveners. It provides that they should 
normally be required to bear their own costs (and that the parties to the liti-
gation should not ordinarily be obliged to pay the intervener’s costs).53 It fur-
ther provides that if an intervener has unreasonably required a party to incur 
additional costs, that party may seek to recover those costs from the inter-
vener.54 This is a relatively modest change in the law and would appear on its 
face to be wholly reasonable, yet even here the government faced opposition. 
Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its report on the legisla-
tion, for example, opined that the provision be omitted and that the matter of 
interveners’ costs should be one for the court to determine in its discretion, 
rather than for Parliament to legislate on.55  
The struggle in 2010-2015 over such modest reforms to the law of judi-
cial review illustrates both the contested nature of contemporary administra-
tive law in the United Kingdom and the opposition any Government is liable 
to face from legal lobby groups (such as Liberty and Justice) if it seeks to 
address and remedy problems of judicial overreach.  
II. IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION 
A. Rationality review and proportionality 
Under the common law of judicial review the courts may declare an 
administrative decision to be unlawful on three basic grounds: illegality, ir-
rationality and procedural unfairness.56 An illegal decision is one that the de-
cision-maker had no authority to make.57 An irrational decision is one that is 
  
 50 JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 6. 
 51 JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND COURTS BILL: JUDICIAL REVIEW (HOUSE OF LORDS REPORT 
STAGE BRIEFING ON AMENDMENTS) 7 (Oct. 2014).  
 52 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, c. 2, § 84(1)(2B) (UK). 
 53 Id. § 87(3). 
 54 Id. § 87(5). 
 55 JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE OF THE 
GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS TO REFORM JUDICIAL REVIEW, 2013-14, HL 174, HC 868, at 4 (UK). 
 56 The Right Honourable Lord Justice Woolf, The Role of the English Judiciary in Developing Pub-
lic Law, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 669, 672 (1986). 
 57 See id. at 672–74. 
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so unreasonable no reasonable decision-maker would have made it.58 An un-
fair decision is one in which the decision-maker has failed to act fairly—that 
is, has failed to act in accordance with the common law principles of natural 
justice.59 Of these three established grounds of judicial review, it is irration-
ality that concerns us here.  
Until the 1980s, this ground of judicial review was known as “Wednes-
bury unreasonableness.”60 The purpose of common law judicial review is not 
to allow litigants to appeal government decisions they dislike; it is narrower 
than that. Constitutionally, the purpose of common law judicial review is to 
enable the courts to ensure that government decisions are lawful. In the 
Wednesbury61 case, Lord Greene MR stated that while the courts could not 
intervene to quash a decision merely because they considered it to be unrea-
sonable, they could intervene if the decision was “so unreasonable that no 
reasonable authority could ever have come to it.”62 In a leading House of 
Lords case in 1984, Lord Diplock recast this formulation in terms of irration-
ality.63 An irrational decision, he said, is one that is “so outrageous in its de-
fiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who 
had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.”64 
In another leading case from the same era, the courts were invited to 
introduce into English administrative law an additional ground of review, 
derived from European law: proportionality. Both the Court of Appeal and 
the House of Lords declined the invitation. Lord Donaldson MR ruled that:  
[I]t must never be forgotten that [judicial review] is a supervisory and not an appel-
late jurisdiction . . . [A]cceptance of ‘proportionality’ as a separate ground for seek-
ing judicial review . . . could easily and speedily lead to courts forgetting the super-
visory nature of their jurisdiction and substituting their view of what was appropriate 
for that of the authority whose duty it was to reach that decision.65  
In the House of Lords, Lord Ackner agreed, stating that a proportional-
ity test would inevitably require the court to make “an inquiry into and a 
  
 58 See id. at 674–75. 
 59 See id. at 675–77. 
 60 Named after the leading case, Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpo-
ration [1948] 1 KB 223.  
 61 [1948] 1 KB 223. 
 62 Id. at 230.  
 63 Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv. [1985] AC 374 (HL) 410 (appeal 
taken from Eng.). Until 2009 the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords was the highest court of 
appeal in the United Kingdom. In 2009 it was replaced by the United Kingdom Supreme Court.  
 64 Id.  
 65 R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, ex parte Brind (1991) 1 AC 696, 722 (appeal taken from 
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decision upon the merits” of the matter and would as such amount to a 
“wrongful usurpation of power”.66 
By contrast with the English common law, proportionality has been cen-
tral to European law for decades—since at least the 1970s.67 This is true for 
both the European Court of Justice and for the European Court of Human 
Rights. For our purposes it is the latter that matters more. The European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg enforces the ECHR, an international human 
rights treaty promulgated under the auspices of the Council of Europe.68 Most 
of the rights protected under the ECHR are qualified rights. Only a few are 
absolute rights (a well-known example is the right to freedom from torture).69 
The rights to privacy, to freedom of religion, to freedom of expression and to 
freedom of assembly are examples of qualified rights under the Convention.70 
In each case, interference with the exercise of the right will be lawful if the 
interference is: (1) prescribed by law; (2) necessary in a democratic society; 
and (3) in pursuit of a legitimate aim. This is all set out in the Convention 
itself.71 Since the 1970s, the European Court of Human Rights has used a 
proportionality test to determine whether or not an interference with a quali-
fied right is “necessary in a democratic society.”72 A proportional interference 
will be lawful (as long as it is also prescribed by law and in pursuit of a le-
gitimate aim), whereas a disproportionate interference will be unlawful (even 
if it is prescribed by law and in pursuit of a legitimate aim).73  
There is no doubt that proportionality is a more intrusive test than com-
mon law irrationality. Unlike common law irrationality, proportionality may 
require courts to inquire not only into the lawfulness of decisions, but into 
their merits. Despite the fact that, as Lord Ackner put it in the Brind74 case, 
  
 66 Id. at 762.  
 67 See Alec Stone Sweet & Giacinto della Cananea, Proportionality, General Principles of Law, 
and Investor-State Arbitration: A Response to Jose Alvarez, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 911, 919–20 
(2014). 
 68 The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg is the principal court of the European Union 
(“EU”). The EU and the Council of Europe are separate international entities. See The Court in Brief, 
EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 
2016). 
 69 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 2889 [hereinafter Human Rights Convention]; Aileen McHarg, Reconciling Human 
Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights, 62 MOD. L. REV. 671, 671 (1999). 
 70 See Human Rights Convention, supra note 69, arts. 8–11 (dealing with privacy, religion, expres-
sion, and assembly). 
 71 Id.  
 72 See Smith v. United Kingdom, 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 45, 76 (providing an example of the court’s 
use of this doctrine).  
 73 See id. at 75, 81. 
 74 (1991) 1 AC 696 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
428 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 24:417 
to cross this line would mark a “wrongful usurpation” of judicial power,75 
once the Human Rights Act 1998 was enacted, the House of Lords ruled that 
courts in the United Kingdom should adopt a test of proportionality, at least 
in cases concerning Convention rights.76 This test, their Lordships ruled, re-
quires the court to ask itself the following questions: (1) whether the objec-
tive pursued by the decision-maker is sufficiently important to justify the 
limitation of a fundamental right; (2) whether the measure adopted by the 
decision-maker is rationally connected to that purpose; and (3) whether a less 
intrusive measure could have been used.77 In ruling in these terms, the House 
of Lords was bringing the United Kingdom into line not only with European 
law, but with the jurisprudence of constitutional and supreme courts across 
the Commonwealth. Indeed, the formulation of the proportionality test pre-
ferred by the House of Lords in the Daly78 case was taken directly from the 
case law of the Canadian Supreme Court.79 
Their Lordships in Daly were candid about the “intensity of review” 
being “somewhat greater under the proportionality approach” than it is under 
common law irrationality, such that it “may therefore sometimes yield dif-
ferent results.”80 Lord Steyn specified as follows: “proportionality may re-
quire the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision maker has 
struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable 
decisions.”81 Further, he added, proportionality “may go further than the tra-
ditional grounds of judicial review inasmuch as it may require attention to be 
directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations.”82 
In the years since, Daly proportionality has become firmly established 
in United Kingdom law as the core doctrine of judicial review in cases con-
cerning Convention rights or points of European Union law. The old common 
law test of irrationality remains for judicial review cases not concerned with 
  
 75 Id. at 757. 
 76 See R (Daly) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2001] UKHL 26, (2001) 2 AC 532, 547–48 
(appeal taken from Eng.).  
 77 Id. at 547. 
 78 [2001] UKHL 26, (2001) 2 AC 532 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 79 See R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103, 139 (Can.). The Oakes test is one of the greatest contem-
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COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 738, 742–43 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., Joel Linsider, 
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 80 R (Daly) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2001] UKHL 26, (2001) 2 AC 532, 547–48. 
 81 Id. at 547.  
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Convention rights or EU law, but, even here, pressure now appears to be 
building for Wednesbury unreasonableness to give way to proportionality.83 
Moreover, the doctrine of proportionality has come to be seen as stretching 
across an even larger canvas than was identified by the House of Lords in 
Daly. In addition to the three questions set out in that case, a fourth has now 
been added: “whether, having regard to . . . the severity of the consequences, 
a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the 
interests of the community.”84 This fourth element of proportionality is its 
most contentious aspect. One of the English Court of Appeal’s most senior 
and respected public lawyers said in a judgment in 2014 that, “there is real 
difficulty in distinguishing this from a political question to be decided by the 
elected arm of government.”85 Be that as it may, the law as it stands was 
recently stated as follows by the President of the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court, in a case called Carlile86: “once a Convention right is affected by a 
decision of the executive, the court has a duty to decide for itself whether the 
decision strikes a fair balance between the rights of an individual . . . and the 
interests of the community as a whole.”87 To return to the terms used by Lord 
Donaldson MR in Brind, this is no longer a merely supervisory jurisdiction 
(in which the courts ensure that the administration has acted lawfully) but a 
fully appellate one (in which the courts decide for themselves where the bal-
ance of the public interest lies).88  
When the Human Rights Act 1998 first came into force, the judges in 
the House of Lords were alive to concerns that it risked upsetting the United 
Kingdom’s established constitutional order by giving to the courts new pow-
ers so significant that they would diminish and perhaps even render obsolete 
the system of giving priority to political forms of accountability. In Alcon-
bury,89 the first case under the Human Rights Act to reach the House of Lords, 
their Lordships were at pains to ensure that this should not happen.90 It is 
  
 83 Supreme Court Justices have recently made suggestions to this effect. See R (Keyu) v. Sec’y of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69, (2015) 3 WLR 1665, 1735, 1738 (appeal 
taken from Eng.); Pham v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2015] UKSC 19, (2015) 1 WLR 1591, 
1621-22 (appeal taken from Eng.); Kennedy v. Charity Comm’n [2014] UKSC 20, [2015] AC 455, 506 
(appeal taken from Eng.). But see Michael Taggart, Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury, 2008 N.Z. 
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 84 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] AC 700, 771 (appeal taken from 
Eng.).  
 85 R (Miranda) v Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2014] EWHC (Admin) 255, (2014) 1 WLR 
3140, 3156.  
 86 [2014] UKSC 60, [2015] AC 945 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 87 Id. at 982.  
 88 See R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, ex parte Brind, (1991) 1 AC 696, 757–58 (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
 89 [2001] UKHL 23, (2003) 2 AC 295 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 90 See id. at 322–23. 
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instructive to compare this case with what has happened subsequently. Al-
conbury arose out of three conjoined disputes about planning, highway im-
provement and compulsory purchase.91 Under the United Kingdom’s plan-
ning legislation, the final decision-maker in certain planning schemes is the 
Secretary of State for the Environment, a minister in central government.92 
This is because determining whether such schemes should proceed may in-
volve broad social and economic issues (including as regards the local econ-
omy, the preservation of the environment, public safety, the development of 
the road network, etc.).93 In a parliamentary democracy it is important that 
such decisions are made by an office-holder who is democratically account-
able—that is to say, by a minister. Alconbury and other property developers 
argued, however, that this was contrary to Article 6 of the ECHR.94 Article 6 
provides that “[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations . . . 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing . . . by an independent and 
impartial tribunal.”95 Alconbury argued that the determination of planning 
appeals affected its property rights, and that such a determination should 
therefore be made by a judicial tribunal, not by the Secretary of State.96  
The House of Lords unanimously rejected this argument and upheld the 
statutory planning schemes, ruling that the legislation was compatible with 
Article 6.97 Principally, this was because, even though the Secretary of State 
was the statutory decision-maker, his (or her) decision-making was subject 
to judicial review.98 Applying the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, the House of Lords ruled that this fact brought the overall decision-
making scheme within the requirements of Article 6.99  
In the course of their opinions in Alconbury, a number of the law lords 
expressed strong views about the implications of the arguments made in the 
case. Lord Nolan emphasized that: 
Parliament has entrusted the requisite degree of control to the Secretary of State, 
and it is to Parliament which he must account for his exercise of it. To substitute for 
  
 91 See id. at 307. 
 92 See id.; see also Transport and Works Act 1992, c. 42, §§ 1, 3, 23(4); Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990, c. 8, §§ 77–79, sch. 6; Acquisition of Land Act 1981, c. 67, § 2(3), sch. 1; Highways Act 1980, 
c. 66, §§ 14(3)(a), 16(5)(a), 18(3)(a), 125, sch. 1. 
 93 See R (Alconbury Devs. Ltd.) v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, Transp. and the Regions, [2001] 
UKHL 23, (2003) 2 AC 295, 324 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 94 See id. at 307–08. 
 95 Human Rights Convention, supra note 69, at 228. 
 96 See R (Alconbury Devs. Ltd.) v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, Transp. and the Regions, [2001] 
UKHL 23, (2003) 2 AC 295, 312 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 97 Id. at 321–22, 342, 355–56, 365.  
 98 See id. at 320. 
 99 See id. at 315–16, 320–22, 352–53, 362 (relying most particularly upon Bryan v. United King-
dom, App. No. 19178/61, (1996) 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 342, 352–53 (1995)).  
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the Secretary of State an independent and impartial body with no central electoral 
accountability would . . . be profoundly undemocratic.100  
Lord Hoffmann said that “[i]n a democratic country, decisions as to 
what the general interest requires are made by democratically elected bodies 
or persons accountable to them.”101 His Lordship cited the right to property 
in the European Convention on Human Rights, and noted that it provides that 
“no one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest . . 
.” and that this provision is expressly stated “not . . . in any way to impair the 
right of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use 
of property in accordance with the general interest.”102 Lord Hoffmann stated 
that the question of what the public or general interest requires for the pur-
poses of the right to property “can, and in my opinion should, be determined 
according to the democratic principle—by elected local or central bodies or 
by ministers accountable to them.”103 Indeed, he suggested that if the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights provided otherwise, he would doubt 
whether it should be followed.104 A European human rights law that required 
the result sought by the claimants in Alconbury, he said, would be one that 
“compelled a conclusion fundamentally at odds with the distribution of pow-
ers under the British constitution.”105 The Human Rights Act, in Lord Hoff-
mann’s view, was designed to give greater effect to Convention rights in a 
manner compatible with the core fundamentals of the United Kingdom con-
stitution: the Act was “no doubt intended to strengthen the rule of law but not 
to inaugurate the rule of lawyers,” he concluded.106  
Whether this remains the case, given the President of the Supreme 
Court’s recent dictum in Carlile, is an open question.107 Indeed, in Carlile, 
another Supreme Court Justice seemed to directly contradict what Lord Hoff-
mann had said in Alconbury, when he was observed that “traditional notions 
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of the constitutional distribution of powers have unquestionably been modi-
fied by the Human Rights Act 1998.”108 
B. Deportation, family life, and proportionality  
“For several years Home Office ministers have been concerned about 
court and tribunal rulings which have prevented them from deporting people” 
from the United Kingdom.109 “There is a presumption [in UK immigration 
law], for example, that migrants who are convicted of serious criminal of-
fenses” and sentenced to a term of imprisonment “will be deported upon re-
lease” from prison.110 “In a series of cases it has been ruled that [such a de-
portation] . . . disproportionately interfere[s] with the right to family life un-
der Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and [is] therefore 
unlawful.”111 Article 8 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”112 Like most 
of the articles in the European Convention, it is a qualified right. It may be 
lawfully restricted if the interference is: (1) “in accordance with the law;” (2) 
“necessary in a democratic society;” and (3) in furtherance of a certain, listed 
legitimate end: national security, public safety, the economic well-being of 
the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health and 
morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.113 As with other 
rights, the key test of “necessity in a democratic society” has been interpreted 
as amounting to a test of proportionality.  
We saw above how the courts in the United Kingdom have developed 
the doctrine of proportionality. We noted that the fourth element of the 
courts’ definition—that a fair balance must be struck between the rights of 
the individual and the interests of the community—has proved to be its most 
  
 108 Id. at 968. In Carlile a member of the House of Lords challenged the decision by the Secretary 
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 113 Id. 
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controversial aspect. The House of Lords ruled in a unanimous opinion in a 
leading immigration law case in 2007, however, that this aspect of the pro-
portionality doctrine “should never be overlooked or discounted.”114  
In October 2011, the Home Secretary complained in her speech at the 
annual Conservative party conference that the courts were “misinterpreting” 
their powers under the Human Rights Act to prevent her from deporting for-
eign criminals from the UK on the basis that such deportations were a dis-
proportionate interference with the right to respect for family life under Ar-
ticle 8.115 Notoriously, the Secretary of State illustrated her argument by ref-
erencing a case in which a claimant had sought to establish that he had a 
family life in the United Kingdom by relying on the fact that he and his part-
ner owned a pet cat together.116 She was pilloried for this, but academic re-
search has shown that there was indeed such a case (albeit that it did not 
concern the deportation of foreign criminals) and that the Asylum and Immi-
gration Tribunal did indeed accept that the ownership of a pet cat reinforced 
the “strength and quality” of the individual’s family life in the UK.117 The 
case was in fact about a Bolivian immigrant who had entered the United 
Kingdom on a student visa and who had unlawfully remained in the UK for 
four years beyond the expiry of his visa.118 He came to the attention of the 
immigration authorities when he was caught attempting to steal a figurine cat 
from a department store.119 
Immigration law in the United Kingdom clearly contemplates that peo-
ple may be deported even where they have a family life in the United King-
dom. In particular, a person subject to immigration control is liable to be 
removed if, “having only a limited leave to enter or remain, he does not ob-
serve a condition attached to the leave or remains beyond the time limited by 
the leave.”120 The mere fact that an offender has a settled family life in the 
UK gives him or her no right to remain. Yet, successive appeal court deci-
sions on the relationship between the UK’s immigration law and the Article 
8 right to family life have made it easier and easier for claimants to show that 
their deportation or removal from the United Kingdom would be in violation 
of Article 8 when they have no right to remain and, indeed—as in the case of 
the Bolivian cat—even when the claimant is in clear breach of immigration 
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 116 Id. 
 117 See David Campbell, “Catgate” and the Challenge to Parliamentary Sovereignty in Immigration 
Law, 2015 PUB. L. 426, 434 (2015).  
 118 Id. at 430. 
 119 Id.  
 120 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, c. 33, § 10(1)(a) (UK). See also Immigration Act 2014, c. 22 
§ 1 (UK).  
434 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 24:417 
law.121 As Professor Campbell rightly points out in his analysis of “catgate,” 
Parliament “obviously did not intend” that a family life so ordinary would 
render those in breach of the terms of their entry “immune to removal” from 
the UK.122 The case law that has so extended the reach of Article 8 that it has 
effectively created new rights to remain in the UK is, in Professor Campbell’s 
judgement, “characterised by a want of appropriate [judicial] deference to as 
perfectly clear a legislative intention as it is possible to conceive.”123 As Pro-
fessor Campbell notes, the case law flies in the face of the “constitutional 
compromise which was the basis on which the Human Rights Act was 
passed.”124 
In her October 2011 conference speech, the Secretary of State undertook 
to amend the Immigration Rules to address the matter.125 The Immigration 
Rules are “rules laid down by the Secretary of State as to the practice to be 
followed in the administration” of immigration law; they regulate “the entry 
into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons not having the right of 
abode.”126 Formally, the constitutional “status of the immigration rules is ra-
ther unusual,” in that “[t]hey are not subordinate legislation but detailed state-
ments by a minister of the Crown as to how the Crown proposes to exercise 
its executive power to control immigration.”127 They are more than mere 
statements of practice or policy, however, for they have the force of law and 
create legal rights; if an immigration decision is taken in breach of the Rules 
it is unlawful.128  
The Rules were duly amended in June 2012.129 A Home Office publica-
tion, Statement of Intent: Family Migration, published alongside the revised 
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Rules, set out the Government’s position.130 The Statement of Intent ex-
plained how the revised Immigration Rules would “set [out] proportionate 
requirements that reflect, as a matter of public policy, the Government’s and 
Parliament’s view of how individual rights to respect for private or family 
life should be qualified in the public interest.”131 The Government hoped that 
this would mean that “failure to meet the requirements of the rules will nor-
mally mean failure to establish an Article 8 claim.”132 In particular, the re-
vised Rules provided that “only in exceptional circumstances will family life 
. . . outweigh criminality and the public interest in seeing the foreign national 
criminal deported where they have received a custodial sentence of at least 
four years.”133 They further provided that “[d]eportation will normally be pro-
portionate where the foreign national criminal has received a custodial sen-
tence of at least 12 months and less than four years . . . and, in the view of 
the Secretary of State, their offending has caused serious harm or they are a 
persistent offender.”134 The Rules also provided for a number of circum-
stances in which deportation would not be proportionate.135  
The Statement of Intent emphasized that “[t]he Courts will continue to 
determine individual cases according to the law but, in doing so, they will be 
reviewing decisions taken under Immigration Rules which expressly reflect 
Article 8” and, moreover, which “for the first time reflect the views of the 
Government and Parliament” as to how Article 8(1) should, as matter of pub-
lic policy, be qualified in the public interest under the terms of Article 8(2).136 
The Statement of Intent recognized that “[t]his does not mean that the Secre-
tary of State and Parliament have the only say on what is proportionate,” 
but—clearly—the plain intention was to reclaim from the courts the power 
to decide how the balance should be struck between the public interest and 
individual rights.137 The assumption was that if an immigration decision was 
within the revised Rules it would, absent wholly exceptional circumstances, 
be compatible with Article 8.  
Unfortunately, however, this intention was not reflected in the ensuing 
case law. In MF (Nigeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,138 
the Upper Tribunal held that MF’s deportation (he had been convicted of 
handling stolen goods) would be a disproportionate interference with his 
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stepdaughter’s Article 8 right to family life, despite the fact that his deporta-
tion fell within the revised Immigration Rules.139 The Upper Tribunal ruled 
that the new Rules could not be construed as providing a complete code for 
Article 8 claims.140 The Tribunal stated that, under the Human Rights Act 
1998, it (i.e. the Tribunal itself) was bound to act compatibly with Conven-
tion rights, and that this meant that the Tribunal, as well as the immigration 
officer, had to be satisfied that the decision to deport was compatible with 
Article 8.141 On this view, it would be impossible for the executive lawfully 
to claim anything approaching exclusive competence to determine the ques-
tion of where the balance lies between the public interest and individual 
rights. While the Secretary of State’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was un-
successful, that court distanced itself from the Upper Tribunal’s reasoning.142 
Because the revised Immigration Rules provided for an “exceptional circum-
stances” exception to the general proposition that a decision within the Rules 
could not be incompatible with Article 8, the Rules “are a complete code.”143 
The Court of Appeal ruled that “[i]n approaching the question of whether 
removal is a proportionate interference with an individual’s Article 8 rights, 
the scales are heavily weighted in favor of deportation and something very 
compelling (which will be ‘exceptional’) is required to outweigh the public 
interest in removal.”144 On the facts of MF’s particular case, the Court of Ap-
peal upheld the Upper Tribunal’s finding that the position of the claimant’s 
stepdaughter constituted such a compelling or exceptional factor.145  
Despite the fact that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in MF (Nigeria) 
was not as hostile to the Government’s intention in revising the Immigration 
Rules as the Upper Tribunal’s had been, the fact that MF nonetheless won 
his case suggests that the Government’s attempt to use the Immigration Rules 
to settle how the courts should determine the proportionality of decisions to 
deport foreign criminals was unsuccessful. Notwithstanding that MF’s de-
portation fell within the revised Immigration Rules, it was held to be an un-
lawful interference with his stepdaughter’s Article 8 right to family life. The 
Government needed a “Plan B.” One quickly emerged: instead of seeking to 
use the Immigration Rules to lay down what proportionality means in the 
context of deportation decisions and the right to family life, primary legisla-
tion—an Act of Parliament—would be used. The Human Rights Act 1998, 
Section 3, provides that “[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation 
. . . must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights.”146 Any provision of a new Immigration Act seeking to 
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place on a statutory footing what the revised Immigration Rules already 
sought to provide would itself have to be “read and given effect” by the courts 
compatibly with Article 8. However, if Parliament made clear during the pas-
sage of the legislation that, in its view, the new legislation was fully compat-
ible with Article 8 and indeed was designed to eliminate doubt as to when a 
deportation will and will not be a proportionate interference with family life, 
the courts would be more respectful of that than they were about the execu-
tive’s Immigration Rules in MF (Nigeria). 
Case law in other contexts suggested that where Parliament, in enacting 
a statute, has considered carefully the rights-implications of its legislation, 
the courts will be slow to rule that the law is disproportionate.147 For sure, the 
cases state that this will depend on the subject-matter, but in R (Countryside 
Alliance) v. Attorney General,148 Lord Bingham stated that “[t]he democratic 
process is liable to be subverted if, on a question of moral and political judg-
ment” those who oppose the legislation are able to have it quashed in the 
courts despite failing to persuade Parliament not to enact it.149 Likewise, in R 
(Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport,150 Lord Bingham stated that “it is reasonable to expect that our demo-
cratically-elected politicians will be peculiarly sensitive to the measures nec-
essary to safeguard the integrity of our democracy.”151 None of this means 
that the courts will never declare primary legislation to be incompatible with 
Convention rights, but it is, generally speaking, more difficult to challenge 
statute in the courts than it is to challenge other rules or decisions made by 
the executive.  
The result is Section 19 of the Immigration Act 2014. This provision is 
a constitutional innovation. It is the first time a statute has prescribed what 
proportionality means in a particular context and how it should be interpreted 
and applied. It provides that, in determining whether an immigration decision 
is in the public interest—that is to say, is compatible with the Article 8 right 
to family life—a court or tribunal “must . . . have regard” to the following 
considerations: (1) that “[t]he maintenance of effective immigration controls 
is in the public interest” (2) that “[i]t is in the public interest, and in particular 
in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that per-
sons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are able to speak 
English” because they will be “less of a burden on taxpayers” and “are better 
able to integrate into society” (3) that it is likewise in the public interest “that 
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persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are financially 
independent” (4) that “[l]ittle weight should be given to a private life, or a 
relationship . . . that is established by a person at a time when the person is 
in the United Kingdom unlawfully” and (5) that “[l]ittle weight should be 
given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person’s 
immigration status is precarious.”152 These considerations, Section 19 pro-
vides, must apply in all immigration cases.153  
In addition, special provision is made by Section 19 for cases involving 
foreign criminals, as follows: (1) “the deportation of foreign criminals is in 
the public interest;” (2) further, “the more serious the offence committed by 
a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest” in their deportation; (3) 
where a foreign criminal has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 
less than four years, the public interest “requires” their deportation unless 
either (a) the individual “has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom 
for most of [his] life,” and the individual is “socially and culturally integrated 
in the United Kingdom,” and there would be “very significant obstacles” to 
his integration into the country to which it is proposed he be deported, or (b) 
the individual has a subsisting relationship with a partner or a child on whom 
the effect of his deportation would be “unduly harsh;” and (4) where a foreign 
criminal has been sentenced to a term of more than four years’ imprisonment, 
“the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling cir-
cumstances, over and above” those that apply to foreign criminals sentenced 
to less than four years’ imprisonment.154  
In steering these provisions through the legislative process in Parlia-
ment, government ministers explained as follows:  
There is a clear public interest in these aims. These are also matters of public policy 
which we believe is the responsibility of government to determine, subject to the 
views of Parliament . . . It is for Parliament to determine what the public interest 
requires. It is then for the courts to have due regard to that when considering the 
proportionality of any interference in the exercise of an individual’s right under Ar-
ticle 8.155  
It was stated that “[t]he courts have a clear and proper constitutional role 
in reviewing the proportionality of measures passed by Parliament and of the 
executive decisions made under them.”156 Section 19 does not seek to change 
this proper judicial function, ministers said, but “it is right that the Secretary 
of State should expect the courts to give proper weight to the view endorsed 
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by Parliament on how, broadly, public policy considerations are to be 
weighed against individual family and private life rights.”157  
Not everyone agreed. During the legislation’s passage through the 
House of Lords, Lord Avebury, for example, claimed that Section 19 “tries 
to coerce the courts into interpreting Article 8(2) more restrictively” and that 
this amounts to an “attempt to bend the decisions of the courts.”158 Parlia-
ment’s Joint Committee on Human Rights took a more nuanced view. In its 
report on the legislation it noted that:  
There is nothing inherently incompatible with the Convention in Parliament spelling 
out . . . its detailed understanding of the requirements of relevant Convention rights 
in particular contexts. Indeed, such an exercise could be considered to be Parlia-
ment’s fulfilment of the important obligation imposed upon it by the principle of 
subsidiarity . . . .159  
The JCHR was concerned, however, that legislation should not usurp 
the judicial function to determine individual cases.160 It concluded that “[t]he 
provisions in the Bill which seek to guide courts and tribunals in their deter-
mination of Article 8 claims in immigration cases do not purport to go so far 
as to determine individual applications in advance or to oust the courts’ ju-
risdiction.”161  
However, the JCHR then went on to record its unease about the provi-
sions purporting to tell courts and tribunals that “little weight” should be 
given to certain considerations “[t]hat appears to us to be a significant legis-
lative trespass into the judicial function.”162 However, there are no grounds 
for holding that assessment of proportionality in UK constitutional law is 
uniquely or exclusively a matter for the courts. Properly understood, it is a 
joint or shared enterprise between parliamentary government, on the one 
hand, and the courts of law, on the other.  
When the matter was debated in the House of Lords, Lord Pannick sup-
ported the JCHR’s line, and the former Supreme Court justice Lord Brown 
argued against him. Lord Pannick said that Parliament should confine itself 
to identifying which “public interest considerations” the courts should “take 
into account;” it should not seek to instruct the courts as to “how much weight 
to give to relevant factors.”163 Lord Brown welcomed Section 19, saying: 
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In the past, courts have rather too often tended to thwart the attempts of the Govern-
ment to control immigration and deport foreign criminals on the basis on Article 8 
interests. On occasion, they have carried the reach of this article beyond even the 
lengths to which the Strasbourg court itself has gone, and that court is no mean 
exponent of the art of dynamic and creative interpretation of the convention. . . . I 
am strongly in favour of the United Kingdom remaining fully committed to the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights—and the Human Rights Act . . . However, I 
can think of nothing more calculated to induce Government to conclude that the 
nation’s better interests may in fact be served by abandoning our convention com-
mitments that the continual frustration of government policy by an overenthusiastic 
interpretation and application of the convention, not least Article 8.164 
For the Government, Lord Wallace of Tankerness said “I do not believe 
that this is a trespass into the judicial function . . . It is appropriate and proper 
that Parliament determines what the public interest is.”165 This is surely cor-
rect. Contrary to the views of Lord Pannick and the JCHR, Section 19 should 
be seen as a welcome innovation and as underscoring the constitutional fun-
damental that the articulation and protection of human rights is, in the British 
constitutional order, a matter that falls within the responsibility of Parliament 
and Government as much as it falls within that of the courts.  
Section 19 has been cited in several cases since it came into force in 
July 2014.166 In none of these cases have the courts repeated the criticisms of 
the legislation made during its enactment by the likes of Lord Pannick, Lord 
Avebury and the JCHR.167 The first Court of Appeal case to consider Section 
19 was YM (Uganda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,168 in 
which Sir Stanley Burnton went out of his way to reinforce a principle Sec-
tion 19 provides for: namely, that where a foreign criminal has committed a 
serious offence “the public interest in his deportation is so strong” that it is 
“difficult to see” how his deportation would lead to a breach of his Article 8 
rights.169 In the High Court case of R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department170 it was said that the principle was already “well established” 
that where a relationship is formed at a time when one of the parties does not 
have a lawful right to remain in the UK it will only exceptionally be that 
removal would be incompatible with Article 8 and that citation to Section 19 
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to support this principle “is superfluous.”171 The Upper Tribunal appeared to 
be happy to give full effect to Section 19 in AM v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department,172 a decision about the removal of a Malawian individual 
who had unlawfully remained in the UK beyond the expiry of his visa.173 The 
individual sought leave to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis of his 
family life in the UK, but this was refused.174 He appealed to the Tribunal but 
was unsuccessful, the Tribunal relying inter alia upon what section 19 says 
about precarious immigration status.175 AM is clearly a decision in which the 
Tribunal was endeavoring to give full effect to Parliament’s intentions and 
not, to quote Lord Brown to allow Convention rights to be a basis for the 
“continual frustration of government policy.”176  
Professor Campbell, in his expert analysis of “catgate,” portrays Section 
19 as a “remarkable and troubling” provision—as a “most worrying consti-
tutional innovation” in which Parliament, led by the government of the day, 
has committed a “trespass on the judicial function.”177 He lays the blame 
squarely at the courts’ door, arguing that the government acted in this way 
only because it could see no alternative to addressing its “legitimate” concern 
that, in case law on Article 6 and deportation, the courts had themselves re-
peatedly trespassed on the executive and legislative functions in respect of 
immigration policy.178 I agree with Professor Campbell that the government 
had little choice but to seek legislation along the lines of Section 19, but I 
disagree with him that the provision is either troubling or worrying or any 
kind of trespass.  
On the contrary, the provision is a welcome reminder that in the United 
Kingdom’s constitution, while the courts have a considerable role to play in 
ruling upon what is, and what is not, a proportionate interference with Con-
vention rights, theirs is not and should not be the only authoritative voice in 
this regard. There is nothing in any of the domestic jurisprudence to suggest 
that proportionality is exclusively a matter for the courts. While it enhances 
the role of the courts, it would be quite wrong to suppose that the emergence 
of proportionality as a ground of judicial review in Convention rights cases 
means that government and Parliament have no meaningful contribution to 
make.  
This is reflected both in the Human Rights Act itself and in the courts’ 
case law. The Act provides that it is ministers and Parliament (not courts) 
who are responsible for policing the compatibility of Bills with Convention 
  
 171 Id. ¶ 30. There is a similar dictum in R (Agyeman) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2015] 
EWHC (Admin) 633, [19]–[20].  
 172 [2015] UKUT (IAC) 260, AM (S. 117B: Malawi) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 173 Id. ¶ 2. 
 174 Id. ¶ 3. 
 175 Id. ¶ 14. 
 176 5 Mar. 2014, 752 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2014) col. 1396 (UK). 
 177 See Campbell, supra note 117, at 427, 438.  
 178 Id. at 437.  
442 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 24:417 
rights; the judicial role comes into play only after the Bill is enacted and has 
come into force.179 Section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that a 
minister promoting a Bill through Parliament must, before its parliamentary 
consideration gets underway, make a statement to Parliament either that in 
his view the Bill is compatible with Convention rights or, if he is unable to 
make such a statement, that the government wishes Parliament nonetheless 
to proceed with the Bill.180 As part of the Section 19 certification process, it 
is axiomatic that ministers will have to make their own assessment of whether 
a Bill proportionately or disproportionately affects any Convention right en-
gaged by the legislation.  
Further, in numerous cases the United Kingdom Supreme Court has rec-
ognised that, even in the Human Rights Act era, there is a constitutionally 
important role for parliamentarians to play in deciding how individual rights 
and the public interest should be balanced. In AXA General Insurance,181 for 
example, Lord Hope noted that “elected members of a legislature . . . are best 
placed to judge what is in the country’s best interests as a whole” not least 
because of “the advantages that flow from the depth and width of the experi-
ence of [] elected members and the mandate that has been given to them by 
the electorate.”182 
All of the above shows that, properly understood, proportionality is a 
matter in the UK’s constitutional order for both courts and Parliament to as-
sess. For sure, it is troubling and worrying that the courts have been so cav-
alier with their overzealous interpretation of Article 8 in immigration deci-
sions that the Government felt it had no option but to legislate to correct this, 
but Section 19 of the Immigration Act 2014 should be heralded—not con-
demned.  
III. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 was, like the Human Rights Act 
1998, another piece of ground-breaking constitutional reform legislation en-
acted in Tony Blair’s first term of office. Before the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000 (“FOIA”) the United Kingdom had no comprehensive law entitling 
individuals to seek access to information held by government and other pub-
lic authorities. A series of internal directives and codes of practice had begun 
to partially liberalize access to government information from the 1970s 
through to the 1990s, but FOIA marked a step-change in the openness of 
British government.183 Its scope is broad—more than 100,000 bodies fall 
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within its remit—and it enacts legally enforceable rights of access to infor-
mation.184 The Act is overseen by a powerful agency, the Information Com-
missioner, to whom complaints may be made in the event that a public body 
refuses access to information.185 Onward appeals lie from decisions of the 
Information Commissioner to a Tribunal and, ultimately, to the United King-
dom Supreme Court.186 Like all modern freedom of information laws, the 
UK’s FOIA exempts certain categories of information from disclosure. Some 
exemptions are automatic. Thus, for example, information relating to na-
tional security or to an ongoing criminal investigation may not be disclosed 
under the Act.187 But most exemptions are not of this nature: most are subject 
to a “public interest” test. That is to say that “in all the circumstances of the 
case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public 
interest in disclosing the information.”188 Two examples will suffice. Section 
35 of FOIA provides that information relating to the formulation or develop-
ment of government policy is exempt, and Section 37 provides that infor-
mation relating to communications with senior members of the Royal Family 
is exempt.189 At the time of FOIA’s enactment, neither of these exemptions 
was automatic; each would apply only if the public interest in maintaining 
the exemption outweighed the public interest in disclosure.190 
Where the Information Commissioner or a tribunal or court determines 
that the public interest requires information to be disclosed, Section 53 of the 
Act provides that a Cabinet Minister or the Attorney General may override 
such a decision.191 In this event, reasons must be given by the Cabinet Min-
ister or Attorney General to Parliament.192 The executive override must be 
exercised within 21 days of the decision in question.193 To date, this power 
has been used on only a handful of occasions; each instance has concerned 
either Section 35 or Section 37.194 Its effect is that the last word on determin-
ing where the balance of public interests lies between disclosure and confi-
dentiality rests with a senior minister who will be accountable to Parliament 
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for his decision. Ordinarily, it will be the Information Commissioner or, on 
appeal, a court or tribunal who will make the decision as to where the balance 
of public interests lies. But, in exceptional cases, those who framed FOIA 
considered that the matter would ultimately be one of political assessment, 
not legal judgment. 
The similarity with the immigration and deportation decisions consid-
ered in Part II above is self-evident. As there, so too in the context of FOIA, 
there are competing claims as to who in the United Kingdom constitution is 
the guardian of the public interest—the courts of law or ministers accounta-
ble to Parliament.  
The first uses of the Section 53 veto power each related to claims that 
minutes of certain Cabinet Committee meetings should be released.195 These 
were meetings discussing such matters as the lawfulness of the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq.196 Disclosure was resisted by the relevant government departments 
on Section 35 grounds: i.e. that the material in question related to the formu-
lation and development of government policy and was therefore exempt.197 
The Government published a statement of policy on its use of the Section 53 
veto in these circumstances. The statement of policy explained that ministers 
would not use the Section 53 veto simply where they considered that the 
public interest in withholding the information outweighed that in disclosure, 
but would do so only if “release of the information would damage Cabinet 
Government and/or the constitutional doctrine of collective responsibility.”198 
The constitutional convention of collective responsibility is central to the 
United Kingdom’s system of parliamentary government.199 It provides that 
all ministers are responsible for Government policy. The rule is important 
because it facilitates the effective accountability of the Government to Par-
liament; ministers may not seek to evade or avoid responsibility by claiming 
that they do not agree with or approve of it. Whether they have argued for or 
against a particular matter in private, once adopted as Government policy, all 
ministers must defend the matter in public and in Parliament, or resign from 
the Government. For all of these reasons—and especially given the high con-
stitutional status of collective responsibility—there is, in the Government’s 
view, a strong public interest that it not be undermined.  
It is not the case, however, that the Section 53 veto may be used only 
for the purpose of safeguarding collective responsibility. In 2012 it was ex-
ercised for the rather different reason of protecting a “safe space” for the 
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development of public policy.200 This instance concerned the Government’s 
plans to reform the National Health Service (“NHS”) in England.201 These 
plans were hotly contested along party political lines.202 An opposition Mem-
ber of Parliament and a journalist at the Evening Standard newspaper made 
FOIA requests for the risk registers that officials in the Department of Health 
had prepared in the light of the Government’s planned reforms.203 It became 
apparent that there were two such risk registers: a Transition Risk Register 
(“TRR”) and a Strategic Risk Register (“SRR”). The Information Commis-
sioner recognized that their disclosure fell within the Section 35 exemption 
but determined that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the public 
interest in confidentiality.204 The Secretary of State for Health appealed to the 
Tribunal.  
The Tribunal heard evidence from a former head of the civil service, 
Lord O’Donnell, that “risk registers are the most important tool used across 
government to formulate and develop policy for risk management.”205 In this 
case, the TRR was used mainly at official level to monitor implementation 
and operational risks associated with the Government’s reforms.206 The SRR 
was used at both official and ministerial levels to monitor larger-scale risks 
that might require to be brought to ministers’ attention.207 The Tribunal found 
that “[t]his is a difficult case” because “[t]he public interest factors for and 
against disclosure are particularly strong.”208 It ruled that the TRR should be 
disclosed and that the SRR should not be disclosed.209 It justified this conclu-
sion by holding that the SRR “was deserving of a protected safe space so that 
the Government could consider how to best deal with the unprecedented level 
of public debate” surrounding its proposed NHS reforms.210 The TRR, by 
contrast, was concerned not with “direct policy consideration” but with op-
erational risks.211 As such, its disclosure “would have informed the public 
debate at a time of considerable public concern” and “could have gone a long 
way to alleviating these concerns and reassuring the public.”212 
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The Secretary of State for Health exercised his Section 53 power to veto 
the disclosure of the TRR.213 The Information Commissioner reported the 
matter to the House of Commons, noting that the use of the veto in this case 
did not satisfy the Government’s own tests as to when it could be exercised.214 
Production of the TRR would not have damaged Cabinet Government; nor 
would it have undermined collective responsibility.215 Furthermore, the In-
formation Commissioner noted, the Government had disclosed risk registers 
in other contexts (such as the proposed expansion of Heathrow Airport) with-
out any apparent damage to the public interest.216 Whereas the Government 
had claimed that it would use the veto power in the context of the Section 35 
exemption only exceptionally, no exceptional circumstance pertained to the 
TRR and, in the Information Commissioner’s opinion, the Secretary of State 
was wrong to veto the Tribunal’s decision.217 
This episode occurred towards the end of a parliamentary inquiry into 
the effectiveness of the Freedom of Information Act. The committee under-
taking that inquiry heard evidence that the Section 53 veto power was an 
essential component of the Act and that, without it, the Blair Government 
“would have dropped” the legislation.218 The minister responsible for steering 
the Freedom of Information Bill through Parliament told the committee that 
“[w]e had to have some backstop to protect Government.”219 The committee 
accepted this, concluding that “the power to exercise the ministerial veto is a 
necessary backstop to protect highly sensitive material.”220 Given that the 
Act, in the committee’s view, “has provided one of the most open regimes in 
the world for access to information at the top of Government, we believe that 
the veto is an appropriate mechanism, where necessary, to protect policy de-
velopment.”221 
Despite this all-party view, however, further controversy about the use 
of the Section 53 veto power was to erupt in 2015 and, on this occasion, the 
cause was an extraordinary judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme 
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Court.222 The case is R (Evans) v Attorney General223 and it concerns the Heir 
to the Throne, HRH The Prince of Wales.224  
The United Kingdom monarchy, while historically powerful, has over 
the centuries seen its powers much diminished, as government has passed 
from the Royal Household to ministers and Parliament. The Sovereign re-
mains Head of State and, as such, She has the constitutional “right to be con-
sulted, the right to encourage, [and] the right to warn” as Walter Bagehot put 
it in his great work on The English Constitution.225 In practice, this means 
principally the right to be consulted by, the right to encourage, and the right 
to warn the Prime Minister. Her Majesty the Queen meets the Prime Minister 
weekly for these purposes. There is no one else present at these meetings, 
and no official record is kept of what is discussed at them. The monarchy 
may remain influential, but it now possesses few formal powers. Those which 
it retains may be exercised only on ministerial advice. Any such encourage-
ment or warning as Her Majesty the Queen wishes to convey to the Prime 
Minister is very strictly confidential. The twentieth century’s leading author-
ity on the monarchy and the United Kingdom constitution, Professor Bog-
danor, has stated that “any private comments are made discreetly and cau-
tiously so that relations with ministers are not compromised.”226 Professor 
Bogdanor adds that the Sovereign “is not entitled to make it known that he 
or she holds different views on some matter of public policy from those of 
the government. It is a fundamental condition of royal influence that it re-
mains private. It follows, therefore, that the sovereign must observe a strict 
neutrality in public.”227 
The current monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, has observed these strictures 
dutifully throughout her reign. The Heir to the Throne, by contrast, has used 
his unrivalled position in British public life to air concerns about a wide range 
of public policy matters, from medicine to genetically modified crops, from 
cuts to the armed services to modern architecture and from agriculture to ur-
ban planning.228 In 2005, journalists at the Guardian newspaper made a series 
of FOIA requests seeking access to correspondence between the Prince of 
Wales and a number of Government departments.229 They were concerned to 
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know whether the Heir to the Throne had lobbied ministers or had sought to 
affect Government policy in any way, given the range of issues on which he 
had spoken out in public.230 Access to all such correspondence was refused 
on the ground that it fell within the section 37 exemption outlined above.231 
Evans, a Guardian journalist, appealed to the Tribunal, which upheld aspects 
of his appeal and ordered that certain parts of the correspondence should be 
disclosed.232 The Attorney General exercised the Section 53 power to veto 
this decision. He reasoned that “[t]he potential damage that disclosure would 
do to the principle of The Prince of Wales’ political neutrality, which could 
seriously undermine the Prince’s ability to fulfil his duties when he becomes 
King.”233 One might consider this to be a reason to disclose the correspond-
ence in question, not to withhold it; if it shows that the Prince has so under-
mined his political neutrality that he would not be able to fulfil the obliga-
tions of the monarch, is there not a compelling public interest in knowing 
that? 
Be that as it may, the Freedom of Information Act clearly provides that 
in a case such as this the final decision on where the public interest lies is for 
a minister responsible to Parliament.234 The Guardian, however, did not see 
it like that. The newspaper went to court, seeking a judicial review of the 
Attorney General’s exercise of the veto.235 Section 53(2) provides that a re-
sponsible minister may certify that information should not be released if “on 
reasonable grounds” he is satisfied that the public interest so requires.236 The 
Guardian argued that, in this instance, the Attorney General had no such rea-
sonable grounds.237 The newspaper contended that all the Attorney General 
had done was to restate arguments that had not found favour with the Tribu-
nal.238 This, it claimed, could not constitute reasonable grounds for a Govern-
ment minister seeking to overturn the ruling of a judicial body.239 The High 
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Court disagreed, and upheld the Attorney General’s decision.240 The court 
noted, however, the extremely unusual nature of Section 53.241 Plainly the 
court was disturbed by the rule of law implications of a statutory power ena-
bling the executive branch to override a judicial determination.242 
The Guardian appealed to the Court of Appeal, and won. The appeal 
court shared the High Court’s concerns about the nature of Section 53, which 
was described by Mr. Evans’ counsel as allowing someone who is “neither 
independent nor impartial, but a part of the executive arm of government” to 
make an intervention that “subverts the final, binding character” of a judicial 
ruling.243 The Court of Appeal quashed the Attorney General’s certificate, 
holding that he did not have reasonable grounds for forming the opinion upon 
which it was based:   
The mere fact that he reached a different conclusion from the [Tribunal] in weighing 
the competing public interests involved was not enough. He had no good reason for 
overturning the meticulous decision of the [Tribunal] reached after six days of hear-
ing and argument. He could point to no error of law or fact in the [Tribunal’s] deci-
sion . . . .244 
The Attorney General appealed to the Supreme Court, but was unsuc-
cessful. Whereas the Court of Appeal had been unanimous, the matter split 
the Supreme Court five to two.245 The majority ruled that the Court of Appeal 
had been correct to quash the Attorney’s certificate, and ordered that the cor-
respondence be disclosed in accordance with the determination of the Tribu-
nal.246 Lord Neuberger, the President of the Supreme Court, gave the lead 
judgment, in which he ruled as follows:  
A statutory provision which entitles a member of the executive . . . to overrule a 
decision of the judiciary merely because he does not agree with it would not merely 
be unique in the laws of the United Kingdom. It would cut across two constitutional 
principles which are also fundamental components of the rule of law. First . . . it is 
a basic principle that a decision of a court is binding as between the parties, and 
cannot be ignored or set aside . . . . Secondly, it is also fundamental to the rule of 
law that decisions and actions of the executive are . . . reviewable by the court. . .247  
For Lord Neuberger, this did not mean that Section 53 could have no 
effect, but it did mean that its effect had to be limited, at least when the veto 
was being exercised to overturn a judicial decision.248 As the Information 
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Commissioner is not a judicial organ—he is an independent executive 
agency—Lord Neuberger’s constitutional concerns about Section 53 would 
not apply with the same force where a minister is seeking to veto a determi-
nation made by the Information Commissioner.249 Lord Neuberger was of the 
view that a judicial decision could be lawfully vetoed under Section 53 only 
where there was a “material change of circumstances” since the tribunal or 
court decision, or where the judicial ruling was “demonstrably flawed in fact 
or in law.”250 He accepted that “this conclusion results in [S]ection 53 having 
a very narrow range of potential application.”251 
Two Justices dissented. Lord Hughes took issue directly with what Lord 
Neuberger had said about the rule of law. It “is of the first importance,” Lord 
Hughes said, “[b]ut it is an integral part of the rule of law that courts give 
effect to Parliamentary intention. The rule of law is not the same as a rule 
that courts must always prevail.”252 This, with respect, is precisely correct. 
Had Parliament wanted Section 53 to be as constrained a power as Lord Neu-
berger interpreted it to be, Parliament could (and, no doubt, would) have said 
so in legislation. “The reality,” Lord Hughes pointed out, is that the Section 
53 “exceptional executive override was the Parliamentary price of moving 
from an advisory power for the [Information] Commissioner . . . to an en-
forceable decision.”253 Lord Wilson was even more forthright. He said that 
the Court of Appeal did not interpret the section, “[i]t re-wrote it. It invoked 
precious constitutional principles but among the most precious is that of par-
liamentary sovereignty, emblematic of our democracy.”254 At paragraph 171 
of his judgment, Lord Wilson identified exactly the issue at stake in this 
case—the issue with which the whole of this paper has been concerned 
with—namely, the public interest. He noted that that a power of executive 
override of judicial determinations about “issues of law would have been an 
unlawful encroachment on the principle of separation of powers . . . But is-
sues relating to the evaluation of public interests are entirely different.”255 
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Lord Wilson cited the words of Lord Hoffmann in Alconbury that “in a dem-
ocratic country, decisions as to what the general interest requires are made 
by democratically elected bodies or persons accountable to them.”256 
CONCLUSION 
We have come full circle. Alconbury was the very first Human Rights 
Act case to reach the United Kingdom’s top court, but what Lord Hoffmann 
correctly stated the law to be in that case is now only cited in the dissenting 
judgments of UK Supreme Court justices. Administrative law in the United 
Kingdom is not yet in crisis, but if the Government’s perfectly legitimate and, 
on the whole, remarkably modest attempts to constrain the ever-growing 
reach of judicial review meet resistance in the case law, it soon will be. For 
the time being a solution appears to have been found in the immigration con-
text in Section 19 of the 2014 Act. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 is 
currently under review and may well face amendment in the coming months 
to restate the force of the view that, in the final analysis, delicate judgments 
about what is necessary in the public interest are constitutionally and appro-
priately for responsible ministers, not courts of law, as the dissenting justices 
in Evans explained.257 Crisis, for the time being, has been averted—but only 
just. Securing a less contested administrative law for the United Kingdom 
will be possible in the medium term only if the courts accept that, whilst they 
are the rightful guardians of the rule of law, judging what the public interest 
requires is ultimately a political question for government and Parliament, not 
a legal one for the judges.  
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